Despite medium-term volatility under a potential Trump 2.0 administration, Rystad Energy projects supply corrections as the norm into the 2030s, potentially overshooting demand by the mid-2030s as demand remains resilient.

There are multiple pathways by which this imbalance of higher supply than demand could be resolved, with this set to be different across regions and demand sectors. Asia and Europe will continue to be the big shorts (deficit) for oil markets, while the Middle East and North America will continue to be long (surplus) and sources of imports. Other regions will continue to evolve and adapt how the major regions resolve the balances.
In a scenario where Trump 2.0 drives growth beyond the 1 million-bpd mark, the price impact would certainly provide a check on the non-US non-OPEC growth as less than 10% of the growth will come from producing wells.
For now, it is realistic to conclude that the OPEC+ unwinding of barrels will certainly have a huge downward impact on the oil prices by around $20 per barrel and that is the only way to bring a check on non-OPEC+ growth.
The question is whether or not this is the strategy OPEC+ will pursue or will really want to take.

This year is likely to be a tipping point, marking the shift from imbalance to balance within the normal range of +1.5 million to -1.5 million bpd.
The current imbalance projected for 2025 to 2033 is estimated to average +2.5 million bpd, which seems unfeasible.
There are multiple pathways to balance the oil markets, but investment cycles will likely continue to fuel the operating imbalance, and geopolitical factors will contribute to market volatility.
The path of increasing demand has the lowest probability, as all scenarios ahead project a decrease in demand growth followed by an eventual decline.

OPEC+ is in a strong position, as demonstrated by its ability to keep oil prices stable within a narrow volatile range despite significant geopolitical risks.
While extending cuts on crude supply, OPEC+ has also focused on strengthening downstream refining and product supply to capture export product markets.
In the longer term, we expect non-OPEC+ supply to decline faster, allowing OPEC+ to maintain its stronghold and gain a larger market share.
Meanwhile, OPEC+ is likely to use both crude market management and product market pressure on refinery buyers of non-OPEC+ crude.
Instead of pursuing a price war to contain non-OPEC+ supply, the back pressure from buyers will restrain non-OPEC+ growth.
Refinery closures in Europe and other non-OPEC+ crude buyers will be a key factor to monitor.
The most significant declines in non-OPEC+ supply, including Brazil, are expected after the 2030s.

This macro level view of oil supply and demand clearly highlights that product market supply pressure leading to lower refinery margins as a tool to restrain non-OPEC+ supply is one of the most important tipping point factors to look out for in 2025.